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UNIVERSITY OF ILLLINOIS BULLETIN 

Issued Weekly 
Vol. XV AUGUST 19, 1918 No. 51 

[Entered as second-class matter December 11. 1912, at the post off-ce at Urbana. Illinois, under 
the Act of August 24, 1912.] 



The Responsibility for the 
Great War 



BY 



LAURENCE M. LARSON 
Professor of History 



An address delivered at a convocation of this College cf Agriculture, 
University of Illinois, May 16, 1918. 




PUBLISHED BY THE WAR COMMITTEE 

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

URBANA 



Kioiut,'-.- 



.15 



''. of B. 

OCT ( tH$ 



THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
GREAT WAR. 

In the summer of 1914, when the Great War suddenly broke upon 
Etirope, there was much perplexity and confusion of thought among 
neutral observers. Signs of a coming test of strength had been plenti- 
ful, but thus far they had proved false: diplomatic "crises" had been 
successfiilly handled; sabers had rattled but had remained in the sheath; 
storm clouds ' ' had failed to break. And now, almost without warning, 
the most malignant forces of civilization were loosened and the world 
war was a fact. 

There was nothing in the European situation of that year that should 
"inevitably" have led to war. Armed conflicts usually come when 
statesmen, diplomats, and the controlling classes lack wisdom in dealing 
with real crises or when the ruling elements actually desire war. Justice 
sometimes demands warfare, but in 1914 justice was evidently aot 
active in the councils of Central Europe. Neutral observers were soon 
in fair agreement that in August of that year a crime had been com- 
mitted — the greatest crime in all the ages. 

In their learch for the criminal they received but slight help from 
the belligerent patties; all tried to load the responsibility for the war 
on the backs of their opponents. Soon after the outbreak, Count 
Andrassy, en eminent Hungarian statesman, in a book entitled "Whose 
Sin is the World War," placed the blame on Russia; England and France 
were responsible in a lesser degree. The Germans, however, were un- 
willing to accept Andrassy 's dictiun; they regarded England as the chief 
criminal and called fervently on the Almighty to join in punishing that 
wicked state. Englsnd in her turn found the responsibility in Berlin 
and poured forth her wrath upon the Kaiser as the symbol of Prussian 
power and perfidy. 

Before many months the neutral world had come to feel that the 
burden of responsibility must ultimately be placed on one of these two 
powers, England or Germany. And, as the war developed, a constantly 
growing number came to feel that the guilt must be charged to the 
German government. It may, therefore, be worth while to review a few 



outstanding facts of recent history, the fuller understanding of which 
has helped to drive mankind toward this conclusion. 

One of the chief controlling factors in British foreign policy in the 
second half of the nineteenth century was a deep-seated fear of Russia. 
Spanning the vast plain from the Baltic Sea to Bering Strait, a distance 
of nearly 5,000 miles, and controlling the destinies of more than 150,000,- 
000 people, the Russian Empire made a tremendous impression on states- 
men two generations ago. But as the century marked its close it 
gradually dawned upon Western Europe that Russia was not able to 
play the part that she had chosen. The outcome of the Russo-Japanese 
war convinced the world that there was much clay in the feet of the 
Russian giant. In England the dread of "the Bear" passed away, but 
it was replaced by another fear — the fear of Germany. 

The belief that Germany might some day become a menace to 
British power began to find expression about thirty years ago, and had 
its origin in competition and rivalry, of which three forms developed: 
commercial, naval and imperialistic. 

I. Commercial Rivalry. 

The commercial rivalry originated during the eighties, when Ger- 
many was beginning her wonderful development along industrial lines. 
Bef re this time England had largely provided the world with manufac- 
tured products; now Germany appeared with a demand for a large 
share of the world's commerce ; her merchants even began to sell their 
wares in the markets of the British Isles. Their success irritated the 
English, ahd parliament (1887) passed an act requiring all goods of 
German origin to be clearly marked "made in Germany." This law did 
not work out as was intended, however, for the Germans seized on the 
phrase and began to use it for trade-mark purposes. 

For a time it was feared in England that the German merchants 
might succeed in their efforts to obtain the leadership in the world's 
trade; but English commerce soon began to show a parallel growth, 
especially during the five years just preceding the war. England was 
apparently on the way to regain her commercial supremacy — to the 
great disgust of the industrial barons of Germany. There was in 1914 
no reason why England should wish to risk a war for the destruction of 
German commerce. 



II. Naval Rivalry. 

The naval rivalry followed the economic expansion of Germany and 
was in a measure an outgrowth of the same. Germany was building a 
large merchant marine, and there is a superstition abroad that such a 
fleet must have the support and protection of a great and efficient navy. 
Twenty-five years ago certain influences in Germany began to agitate 
for a strong naval armament. In 1897 Admiral Tirpitz became the 
chief of naval affairs. It was his purpose to develop a German navy 
so strong that no other power would care to attack it. In this he was 
supported by a powerful organization, the "Navy League," which the 
Krupps helped to finance, and which in a few years could coimt its 
membership by the hundred thousands. 

It has long been the poHcy of England to maintain only a small 
standing army, but to keep afloat a navy as large and as efficient as 
any other two navies : this is known as the two-power standard. The 
character of the British empire necessitates such a policy : nine-tenths 
of the subjects of Britain five outside Europe, most of them thousands 
of miles away. To maintain communication with her dependencies 
over the sea and to provide for their prompt and adequate defense, 
Englands needs a large navy. 

But now comes Germany with a proposal to maintain the greatest 
and most efficient army in the world and to add to it a navy that would 
rival that of England and perhaps ultimately surpass it. If the British 
government were to maintain the two-power standard, more English 
ships must be built; and now began a dangerous competition in ship 
construction which continued to the beginning of the war. This meant 
vast expenditures of money and consequently high taxation. This led 
again to much complaint, especially in England where the government 
was anxiously seeking methods by which to finance certain important 
social reforms, such as national insiu^ance of workingmen and pensions 
for the aged poor. 

Much has been said in recent years about the menace of Prussian 
militarism, to which the Germans have replied by calling attention to 
English navalism. A navy, however, is essentially a defensive weapon; 
its use in offensive warfare is narrowly limited and ordinarily requires 
the cooperation of an army. A great military force, on the other hand, 
can often be used effectively without the support of a fleet, as German 
warfare in the present conflict has abundantly proved. Militarism is a 



greater menace than navalism; but a combination of militarism and 
navalism, as planned by the war lords of Berhn, is the greatest menace to 
the world's peace imaginable. 

About 1901 the EngHsh people began to appreciate the dangers of 
the new situation. The Boer War, which had just been ended, had 
revealed the difficulties of imperial defense; it had also revealed the fact 
that England had no real friend among the great powers. The "splen- 
did isolation" of which a prime minister had boasted a dozen years 
earHer did not look attractive then, more particularly because across the 
North Sea an unfriendly rival was developing a wonderful naval estab- 
Hshment, and England suddenly remembered that she had no fleet with 
which to match and to meet the battleships of Germany riding at 
anchor only 200 miles away. 

In the decade before the war two great problems lay before the 
EngHsh government on the side of the admiralty; to maintain the two- 
power standard and to estabHsh a North Sea fleet. 

The government began by forming an alliance with Japan, according 
to the terms of which the latter power should take over the protection of 
British interests in the North Pacific. This would release a mmiber of 
British men-of-war, which could be brought home and assigned to duty 
in the North Sea. 

Another important step was the appointment of Sir John Fisher to a 
high office in the British admiralty. Sir John was more than a mere 
administrator; he was a real seaman and appreciated the possibilities 
of naval development. He rebuilt and reorganized the British navy, 
beginning the work by assigning 180 ships to the official jimk heap. But 
John Fisher's activities were not all destructive ; he directed the building 
of a new battleship which was larger, swifter, and carried heavier guns 
than any other battleship afloat. This was the famous Dreadnought, 
which was completed for service in 1906. 

The launching of the Dreadnought produced a sensation in the naval 
world. All the older battleships were suddenly relegated to second 
place. The other great powers immediately felt that they, too, must 
have dreadnoughts. Incidentally the launching of John Fisher's new 
man-of-war postponed the great European conflict for eight years. The 
Germans had cut a canal across Schleswig between the North and Baltic 
seas so as to facilitate naval movements and to provide a refuge for 
their warships and merchantmen at times of great danger. Now it 



was discovered that the Kiel Canal was too narrow to accommodate 
battleships of the dreadnought type. The German government at once 
proceeded to enlarge this waterway and on Jvdy 1, 1914, the work was 
completed. A month later the Kaiser called out his forces, and the 
peace of Europe was at an end. 

III. Imperialistic Rivalry. 

In its early stages the Great War was a struggle for empire; the 
Germans hoped to win colonies and dependencies ; Great Britain wished 
to retain what she already possessed. England did not covet any 
German territory; on the other hand Prussian agitators and publicists 
were constantly calling on the English "land-grabber "to disgorge, not 
for the benefit of subject Asiatics or Africans, but in the interest of 
Prussian capitalists. Though many Englishmen felt that the expansion 
of England had already passed desirable limits, they were averse to 
hauling down the British flag on the demands of a rival and apparently 
unfriendly power. So the Briton set his teeth and informed the Prus- 
sians that "what we hold we shall keep." 

For more than three hundred years the English have been engaged 
in colonizing ventures. Not even a German historian in his serious 
m.om^ents would care to deny that the building of the British Empire has 
brought great benefits not only to England, but to the cause of civili?a- 
tion throughout the world. The German government began to take a 
half-hearted interest in colonial expansion only thirty-five years ago. 
While the English- Puritans were settling New England and laying the 
foundations of the present United States, Germany was fighting the 
Thirty- Years' War. While the English East India Company was 
establishing British power in India, Frederick II and the Prussians were 
engaged in the presumably laudable effort to deprive the Hapsburg 
dynasty of one of its choicest provinces. While Englishrren were 
settling Canada and Australia and making those great regions securely 
British, the two great German states, Prussia and Austria, were occupied 
with the far more spectacular and congenial task of slaughtering Poland 
and dividing the carcass with the Russian Czar. While David Living- 
stone and Cecil Rhodes were exploring and winning South Africa for 
England, Germany was busy strengthening herself in Europe and inci- 
dentally trying to impose Kultur on sundry Danes and Frenchmen who 
had become unwilling subjects of the|^ Kaiser a few years before. 



8 

When the Fatherland at last was ready to consider territorial ex- 
pansion outside Europe, the desirable regions had long been appropria- 
ted. The territories that fell to Germany in the "scramble for Africa " 
in the eighties were not su:h as would gladden the Prussian imperialist, 
and he looked with longing eyes toward Egypt, India, and South Africa, 
— but there was the Union Jack ! 

In 1901, however, Paul Rohrbach, a German publicist, sketched and 
put forth a plan that looked highly promising; it was to utilize in 
modem fashion the ancient Persian road and trade route from the 
Bosporus to the Persian Gulf. The project was to build a railway from 
Constantinople through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to the mouth of 
the "rivers of Babylon." Ostensibly this railway was to be the means 
for the development of the Near East ; and to this the English had no 
serious objections. But as they reflected on the possibilities of the 
Baghdad railway scheme British statesmen began to feel somewhat 
uneasy. 

(1). East of the Persian Gulf in the Middle and Far East lives one- 
half of the population of the entire world. The European trade of this 
vast region, which in recent years has been carried in large measures in 
English ships through the Suez Canal, would, in part at least, be diverted 
to this far shorter railway route. 

(2). An important branch of the Baghdad system was to run south 
through S>Tia to the neighborhood of the Isthmus of Suez. In a war 
with Germany this might prove extremely important as it would endan- 
ger the English possession of the Suez Canal. If the Germans and Tiirks 
should seize the isthmus, the Germans would possess both of the two 
short routes to the Orient, the Baghdad Railway and the Suez Canal. 

(3). The Syrian branch of the Baghdad Railway could easily be 
connected with the terminus of the Cape to Cairo Railway, which the 
English were building in eastern Africa. It might be an advantage to 
be able to travel by rail from Cape Town to Hamburg, but the English 
feared that the advantage would be chiefly with the Germans. 

(4). It also seemed possible that somewhere on the Persian Gulf 
at the terminal of the Baghdad Railway the Germans might develop 
a naval station sufficiently strong to endanger English supremacy in 
India, which is only four da,ys' sailing distant. India has long been and 
still remains the central fact in the British Empire. It is the richest and 
most populous dependency in all the world and the English are naturally 
not disposed to surrender India to the Germans. 



The German expansionists, who talk glibly of Kultur in Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, India, and China, doubtless based their hopes largely 
on the Baghdad project. And then suddenly the dream vanished. It 
was learned that the chief of an Arab tribe on the shores of the Persian 
Gulf, the sheikh of Koweit, had, even before the Germans had arranged 
to build their railway, placed his territories under the protection of 
England. And the port of Koweit was the only available terminal for 
the great road! 

The English did not come into these regions as interlopers. For 
three hundred years the Union Jack has waved over the Persian Gulf. 
For three hundred years the English navy has policed its waters and 
given trade what security it has been able to enjoy. The Union Jack 
was there even before the Turkish Crescent appeared in the Persian 
Gulf; but the English annexed no territory; they were in those waters 
in the interest of trade only. 

British imperialism is not wholly altruistic; and yet, when it is 
compared with the imperiaHstic policies of other nations, it reveals a 
remarkably unselfish spirit. England does not tax her colonies; the 
taxes raised in Canada, Australia, or India are spent in and for the 
colony that pays the tax. What England wants in the Orient is an 
opportunity to trade on the same terms that are granted to other nations. 
She seeks no monopoly for herself nor does she di criminate in her own 
favor by means of protective tariffs. It may be said in passing that 
the Germans are not able to understand the spirit of British imperial- 
ism; to them it is incontestable evidence that the "shop-keeper" nation 
is an inefficient and inferior race. 

IV. The Entente. 

During the decade when the German expansionists were preparing 
to challenge British power in the Orient, the English diplomats were 
seeking to establish friendly relations with other powers. The alliance 
with Japan (1902) has already been noted. More important were the 
understandings with France (1904) and with Russia (1907) which 
became the basis of the Triple Entente. 

There was no real hostility between France and England in 1904, 
but the feeling was not wholly cordial and in certain parts of the world 
the EngHsh and the French were keen rivals. They had come near to 
collision in central Africa where French Soudan jostles English Soudan. 



^ 



10 

But M. Delcasse, the French foreign minister, felt that with the German 
enemy gaining yearly in strength France could not afford to be on 
imfriendly terms with England. Negotiations were opened with the 
English foreign office, which resulted in a settlement known as the 
entente cordiale. France gave England a quitclaim deed to Egypt 
while England on her part promised not to interfere with the plans of 
France with regard to Morocco. Other questions were also taken up 
and settled to the satisfaction of both parties. 

In 1907 England, to the great astonishment of Europe, came to a 
similar "cordial imderstanding " with Russia. As noted above, English 
statesmen had long feared the steady expansion of Russian territory. 
In spite of her length of coast line, however, Russia was not favorably 
situated with respect to over-seas trade. It was believed, therefore, 
that the Muscovites had an ambition to force their way to the ocean on 
three sides: northwestward into northern Norway to an ice-free port 
on the Atlantic ; southward through the Ttukish Straits to the Mediter- 
ranean; southeastward through upper India to the Indian Ocean. 

With the passing of this fear it became possible to arrange certain 
limits in Asia within which the contracting parties agreed to confine 
their operations. Among the arrangements was the much condemned 
partition of Persia into "spheres of influence." On the British side 
this transaction was entered into with honorable intentions toward Persia 
and perhaps in part from a fear that the German menace, which was 
creeping forward along the Baghdad route, might continue its march 
eastward along the Persian Gulf. 

The Germans professed to see in these negotiations not an effort to 
maintain the balance of power and to secure the interests of England, 
but a diplomatic offensive, a policy of "encirclement," directed against 
Germany to defeat her ambitions and to strangle her economic develop- 
ment. Two men were credited with the chief responsibility for this 
policy: Edward VII, the crafty intriguer who traveled from court to 
court for the piirpose of stirring up enemies against the lovers of peace 
in Potsdam; and Sir Edward Grey, the English secretary of state for 
foreign affairs, who sat in his secluded office in Westminster devising 
means to ensnare naive and unsophisticated diplomats. 

To one who is not a German the policy of encirclement is by no 
means evident and for several reasons seems to be a creature of Prussian 
imagination. 



11 

(1) . The Prassian theory credits King Edward with greater abilities 
than the English people were able to discover in His Genial Majesty. 
It is true that the king had a wide acquaintance in royal circles, but it 
is not likely that his influence with foreign governments was very 
great. 

(2). The entente had its origin in France rather than in England; 
the statesman most responsible for the entente cordiale was Delcasse. 

(3). Sir Edward Grey was not in office in 1904 and had nothing to 
do with the understanding with France. The negotiations on the 
EngHsh side were carried on by Lord Lansdowne, whose intentions were 
surely not to provoke war or even resentment. Lord Lansdowne was 
in the war office during the Boer War and did not come out of that 
conflict with much credit. It was the same Lord Lansdowne who some 
months ago wrote a letter in which he seemed to favor "peace by dis- 
cussion." 

(4). When Sir Edward Grey came into office in 1905, he continued 
the policy of his predecessor and strove to establish friendly relations 
with as many European powers as possible . He came to an understand- 
ing with Russia and succeeded in making certain important agreements 
with Italy and Spain respecting English interests in the Mediterranean 
Sea. In 1914 he was even on the point of reaching a cordial under- 
standing with Germany. 

(5). From 1905 to 1914 the government of England was adminis- 
tered by a cabinet of a Liberal-Radical type, several members of which had 
strong leanings toward pacifism. Two of the ablest ministers. Lord 
Morley and John Bums, resigned in August, 1914, rather than agree to 
make war on Germany. Another member, Lord Haldane, "was even 
under suspicion as being too friendly to Germany. The cabinet as a 
whole was pledged to enact a great program of social reforms, and the 
achievements of the Asquith ministry in this direction are surely notable. 
It was a government that gave nearly all its energies to domestic affairs 
aiid was deaf to appeals for a larger army and militaristic legislation. 

(6). English sentiment diiring this decade was— we may safely 
affirm it— overwhelmingly for peace. There has never been much 
jingoism'in the Liberal ranks and the Unionists had come out of the 
Boer War in a very chastened mood. 

During the same period Germany displayed a spirit that was any- 
thing but pacific. In 1907 the English government suggested that the 



12 

subject of a general reduction of armaments be discussed at the second 
Hague Conference; the Kaiser promptly replied that in that case he 
would have nothing to do with the conference. The following year 
King Edward vnsited his imperial nephew and proposed that England 
and Germany should cease their competition in the building of war 
ships, but to no purpose. The Kaiser "avowed his intention to go to 
war rather than submit to such a thing."' The King retiuned to the 
subject in 1909, but without success. Lord Haldane was sent to Berlin 
on a similar mission in 1912; and in 1913 Winston Churchill suggested 
that the two countries should declare "a naval holiday"; but results 
were not forthcoming, and the two governments continued to build 
more and larger ships. In 1911 the Kaiser created a crisis in Morocco, 
which happily found a peacefiil outcome. In 1913 the Reichstag voted 
large additions to the German army. Various suggestions looking 
toward the arbitration of disputes were made, by our own government 
among others, but Berlin would not listen. And during the whole 
period a series of chauvinistic and abusive books and pamphlets came 
from the German presses in which England was characterized as the 
rival and enem\' which must be dealt with at the earliest opportunity, 
whether the Kiel Canal were finished or not.- 

V. The Eve of the War. 

Time came, however, when those responsible for governmental 
action in Berlin felt less inclined to provoke England. Naval competi- 
tion with the island kingdom looked hopeless, and von Tirpitz finally 
concluded that Germany need not be disturbed if England should build 
sixteen warships to her own ten. A timid, cautious man of rather, 
limited abilities, von Bethmann-Hollweg, had come into the chancellor- 
ship, and he even began to hope for better relations with the English. 
Accordingly, in 1912, he sent to England as German ambassador, Karl 
Max, Prince Lichnowsky, a Silesian nobleman who was not without 
successful diplomatic experience and was known to favor an under- 
standing wdth England and Russia. In Westminster the new ambassa- 
dor found Sir Edward Grey anxious to accomplish the same purpose, 
and the two men proceeded to discuss the terms of a new "cordial 
understanding. ' ' 



'Quoted by Bernadotte E. Schmitt. England and Germany, p. 184. 

-Albrecht Wirth in a book on "'German foreign policies," (1912), favored a war for Morocco. 
"They say we must wait for a better moment. Wait foi the deepening of the Kiel Canal, for our 
naval program to have taken full effect," etc. Conquest and Kultur (1918), p. 117. 



13 

Since von Tirpitz had accepted the naval ratio of ten to sixteen, 
there remained only two matters that needed serious consideration : the 
Baghdad Railway and Germany's dsmand for colonial possessions. 
On both thsse points the negotiators seem to have reached satisfactory 
agreements. 

(1). England agreed that the Germans might extend the Baghdad 

Railway to Basra, a point about 70 miles from the Persian Gulf. From 

Basra to the Gulf the road was to be built and controlled by the English, 

This left almost the whole of the great river valley to German capitalists 

/ and engineers. In return the Germans agreed to recognize the rights 

Vof earlier English investments in this region. 

/'-"'^ (2). Portugal still had important colonial possessions in East and 
West Africa which the Germans coveted. The Portuguese had held 
these for four centuries, but had done very little to develop them and 
might find it expedient to sell them. Sir Edward Grey could not dispose 
of these colonies, but he agreed that, in case Portugal should wish to sell 
them to Germany or ask Germany to assist in developing them, England 
would offer no objections. 

These agreements were made, but the tieaties were never signed. 
Sir Edward Grey insisted that the agreements must be made public; 
Berlin demanded that they be kept secret. Finally, in July, 1914, the 
Germans concluded that the treaties might be of value and agreed to 
Sir Edward's terms; but it was then too late. 

Meanwhile a spirit of dissatisfaction and wrath had descended upon 
the ruling classes in Germany. To the earlier chauvinism, bigotry, and 
lust for territorial expansion there was now added a painful sense of 
humiliation and defeat. The Fatherland, though destined, as the 
Prussians believed, to direct and reshape the world, found its aims and 
ambitions foiled or balked at every turn. The Morocco venture (1911) 
had brought nothing but disappointment. In the First Balkan War 
the Turk, now a friend of Germany, had been disastrously beaten. In 
the second Balkan War, Bulgaria, for whom the Central Powers had 
hoped a victory, was defeated (1913). As a result of these wars the 
Turkish frontier was moved 400 miles away from the Austrian border, 
and Serbia had planted her flag in the route to the Aegean. Roumania, 
though ruled by a Hohenzollern, was cultivating the friendship of the 
Triple Entente, and there was danger that the Baghdad Railway in its 
European section would have to pass through unfriendly territory in 



14 

Serbia or Roumania. The ties that bound Italy to the Central Powers 
were loosening. The outlook was not pleasant. 

True to their history the Prussian war lords determined to strengthen 
the position of Germany by increasing the strength of the army. By 
the military law of 1913 the peace strength of the military forces was 
increased from 723,000 to 870,000. In other respects, too, the army 
was made stronger and more efficient. 

The result of this legislation was a panic in the neighboring capitals. 
France in the face of strong SociaHstic opposition voted to strengthen 
her army by lengthening the term of service. Belgium followed the 
example of her greater neighbors and provided for universal service. 
Russia also lengthened the term of miUtary service. Sweden went 
through a violent agitation for greater preparedness. England, alone, 
refused to make any changes in her military establishment. 

Dining the earlier months of 1914 there was much talk about 
"inevitable" war in Germany. A host of agencies, unofficial but 
effective, were combining to force the nation over the precipice. The 
SociaHst newspaper Vorwaerts wrote with regret about the constant 
barking of the war dogs: "The naval League of Germany numbers 
100,000 members, while the various associations of veterans, which 
include about 2,000,000 members in all, are genuine hotbeds of jingoism."* 
The paper also calls attention to "the venomous character of the teach- 
ing in our public schools" and notes the fact that the "first atlas put 
into the hands of children nine years old" contains plans of the impor- 
tant battles of the Franco-Prussian war and traces the routes of the 
German forces in that war. 

VI. The Outbreak of War. 

The "will to war" was evidently present among the Prussians in 
the spring of 1914, but there must always be a good cause or at least a 
colorable pretext, if war is to be justified. Suddenly the pretext came 
in the murder of the Austrian Archduke on June 28 of that year. Two 
days later the Kiel Canal was completed; Germany was ready at last. 
The recent increases in the armies of her neighbors had not yet proved 
very fruitful; the situation was really fortunate. In France there was 
violent opposition to the new military law. Russian industry was 
threatened with paralysis from labor troubles. In Ireland 80,000 
Ulstermen were in arms against 80,000 Irish volunteers to prevent the 

'See The Literary Digest, Feb. 2^, IQIS, p. 423. 



15 

extension of "home rule" to northern Ireland. The signs were favor- 
able; Germany ought to strike. 

On July 5, a week after the murder of the Archdiike, the Kaiser 
presided at a war council at Potsdam where the great crime was deter- 
mined upon. Little is known about the personnel and the discussions 
of the Potsdam Conference, but it is known that Austria was given 
assurance of support in the matter of Serbia even to the point of war 
with Russia. 1 The financial magnates of the empire asked fo two or 
three weeks to set their house in order, and the request was granted. 
Foreign secretary von Jagow went to Vienna to arrange details, and 
in due time the famous ultimatimi was presented to Serbia. On July 
28 Austria declared war on the Serbs. Three days later Germany 
declared war on Russia and prepared to invade France. 

The German government has tried to make the world believe that 
war came when it did because Russia had mobilized, the order having 
been issued in the afternoon of July 31. Whether this was a general 
mobilization has been questioned; but the matter is unimportant, as 
partial mobiHzation may fall only a very little short of a general mobili- 
zation. It is quite likely that, during those last days of July, all the 
great powers were mobilizing, for it was clear that Europe was steadily 
being pushed toward war. 

Germany was also mobilizing with the rest. The German White 
Book states that "the Kaissr ordered the mobilization of the entire 
German army and navy on August 1st at 5 p. m."^ The word entire 
should be noted, as it may be important. On that same day, August 1, 
presumably after 5 p. m.. Kaiser Wilhelm telegraphed to the king of 
England that he had ordered mobilization. "I hope that France will 
not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being 
kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French 
frontier."^ 

That an army strong enough and sufficiently equipped for invasion 
could be gotten together in the few hoiirs that remained of August 1 
ssems unthinkable. And yet, on that date, there was evidently a 
strong force on the French border tugging at the reins. The truth seems 
to be that German fear of Russian mobilization was pretense merely. 



1 For information as to the Potsdam Conference, seethe War Cyclopedia (Washington. 1917). the 
World's Work, June, 1918 (article by Ambassador Morgenthau), and the recently published Mem- 
orandum of Prince Lichnowski, German Ambassador to England, 1912-1914. 

^Diplomatic Documents of the European War (London, 1915), p. 413. 

*Ibid.. p. 540. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

015 845 409 9 ^ 

16 

Earlier than August 1 there must have been a partial though quite exten- 
sive German mobilization on the French frontier, the imperial telephone 
service holding the forces in check until proper orders for mobilization 
could be issued. Meanwhile, it was feared that a "nervous" France 
might also mobilize. 

During those fateful days of July, 1914, the eyes of England were 
turned toward Ireland, where civil war was threatening. The govern- 
ment was struggling with a series of difficult domestic problems and 
was not prepared for war. The British navy was ready for immediate 
action, but military and financial preparedness had been neglected. 

The English telegraph service (like that of Germany, though in a 
different spirit) was set in motion to restrain the armies on the frontiers 
of Europe. Sir Edward Grey fought valiantly to preserve the peace of 
the world and was almost successful. He proposed a scheme of media- 
tion which even Austria, the nation most directly concerned, was wilHng 
to accept. "We are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. 
Grey to negotiate between us and Servia"' wrote the Austrian foreign 
minister on July 31. 

On that day fate laid the issues of war and peace into the hands of a 
single man, the Kaiser at Berlin. His position was such that he, and 
he alone of all the rulers in the world, had the power to choose whether 
peace should continue in Europe. For two days he entertained the 
temptation; on the second day he announced his choice; and the forces 
of destruction— war and famine, disease and death— leaped forth across 
the world. 

^Diplomatic Documents of the European War. p. 526. 



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